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Abstract This article explores how the concept of consent to medical treatment 
applies in the veterinary context, and aims to evaluate normative justifications for 
owner consent to treatment of animal patients. We trace the evolution of the test 
for valid consent in human health decision-making, against a backdrop of increased 
recognition of the importance of patient rights and a gradual judicial espousal of a 
doctrine of informed consent grounded in a particular understanding of autonomy. 
We argue that, notwithstanding the adoption of a similar discourse of informed con-
sent in professional veterinary codes, notions of autonomy and informed consent are 
not easily transferrable to the veterinary medicine context, given inter alia the tripar-
tite relationship between veterinary professional, owner and animal patient. We sug-
gest that a more appropriate, albeit inexact, analogy may be drawn with paediatric 
practice which is premised on a similarly tripartite relationship and where decisions 
must be reached in the best interests of the child. However, acknowledging the legal 
status of animals as property and how consent to veterinary treatment is predicated 
on the animal owner’s willingness and ability to pay, we propose that the appropri-
ate response is for veterinary professionals generally to accept the client’s choice, 
provided this is informed. Yet such client autonomy must be limited where animal 
welfare concerns exist, so that beneficence continues to play an important role in the 
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veterinary context. We suggest that this ‘middle road’ should be reflected in profes-
sional veterinary guidance.
Keywords Informed consent · Veterinary medicine · Autonomy · Beneficence
Introduction
Veterinary surgeons must communicate effectively with clients and ensure 
informed consent is obtained before treatments or procedures are carried out. 
(Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons 2017a)
 In its Code of Professional Conduct, the Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons 
(RCVS), the governing body of the veterinary profession in the United Kingdom, 
stipulates that informed consent is required before treatment may be given to an 
animal patient. However, we will suggest that more clarity is needed about what 
exactly this obligation to obtain “informed consent” entails, and what the ethical 
underpinnings of such an obligation are.1 These matters have attracted scant atten-
tion in the UK legal literature (Schnobel 2017)2—a position which contrasts starkly 
with the now extensive ethico-legal scholarship analysing the meaning, purpose and 
ethical underpinnings of the doctrine of informed consent in human healthcare. We 
begin by examining to what extent, if at all, jurisprudential arguments in favour of 
recognising patient autonomy, and thus compelling disclosure of the risks of treat-
ment in the human medical context to ensure informed consent, are applicable to 
veterinary medicine. One recent paper by Ashall et  al. (2018) does focus on vet-
erinary informed consent from an ethical perspective, arguing that there is currently 
an overreliance on owner consent, with the consequence that veterinary profes-
sionals may too readily accede to client requests. Having framed informed consent 
as an ethical pivot point, Ashall et al. conclude that “what is urgently needed is a 
thorough re-evaluation of the scope of authority of veterinary informed consent…” 
(Ashall et al. 2018:255). Concurring with this conclusion, we propose that such re-
evaluation must begin by unpacking competing understandings of decision-making 
in these professions. In human medicine we trace an incremental shift away from 
a presumption that the medical professional knows what is best for the patient (the 
so-called “paternalism” model), towards a presumption that the “reasonable patient” 
would want to know about the risks and choices inherent in his or her treatment (the 
1 The RCVS recently (March 2018) updated its supporting guidance on informed consent for veterinary 
professionals, with the main additions being the timing of the consent discussion, who should obtain 
consent, a list of topics that should be covered during the consent discussion and the purpose of the 
consent form. It did not include advice on respecting client autonomy. See RCVS 2018, in Supporting 
Guidance.
2 Schnobel, although not addressing the issue of consent specifically, argues for a “best interests” 
derived standard of care for animal patients, rather than one based on the commercial relationship 
between veterinary professional and animal owner.
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“autonomy” model). A strand of case law, culminating in the 2015 Supreme Court 
decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board,3 confirms that patient auton-
omy is now the core legal principle underpinning contemporary healthcare law, and 
that informed consent is the legal mechanism for promoting this autonomy. Corre-
sponding duties have been imposed on healthcare professionals to respect patients’ 
rights and disclose information. In law, respect for patient autonomy extends to 
adults who no longer have capacity, with legislation stipulating that reference to pre-
viously known wishes should supplement an objective “best interests” calculation.4
This current dominance of autonomy has, however, generated criticism in the 
human medicine context, with commentators arguing that the pendulum has swung 
too far in favour of autonomy, and that an emphasis on autonomy neglects patient 
responsibility (Brazier 2006).5 In this article we suggest that such concerns apply 
with still greater force in the veterinary medicine context. The paradigmatic rela-
tionship in the human medicine context is the dyadic relationship between health 
professional and competent adult patient.6 The associated assumption is that deci-
sion-making is also the product of a transaction between the health professional and 
the patient. By contrast, in the veterinary context a more complex tripartite relation-
ship exists between the veterinary professional, the owner and the animal patient 
(McGreevy and Bennett 2010).7 Applying the notion of informed consent to this 
relationship is challenging. Difficulties in ascertaining the wishes of the animal 
patient are compounded by the animal’s legal status as property or object rather than 
legal subject.8 This seems to entail that the consent to be sought—and therefore the 
autonomy to be respected—must be that of the owner, rather than the patient. This is 
reinforced by the fact that the legal agreement will be a contractual one between the 
veterinary professional and the owner (Mulheron 2017). These factors seem to sug-
gest that in veterinary medicine what matters most is the autonomy of the “client” 
(or “owner”), who seems to occupy a position analogous to the human “patient”. 
However, such an assumption is ethically problematic in erasing the interests of 
the animal, and seems at odds with understandings of companion animal patients 
as more akin to family members than mere chattels (Fox 2004; Charles and Davies 
2008; Ashall and Hobson-West 2017).9 In recognition of this, in practice, several 
3 [2015] 1430 AC 1.
4 The Mental Capacity Act 2005 S4.6 states that previous known wishes, beliefs and values should be 
considered if these can be reasonably ascertained. See also Taylor (2016).
5 Brazier fears that this shift neglects patient duties to avoid harm to others, for example. Interestingly, 
she paints a bleak picture of a health service based on a ‘consumer-orientated’ model, which reflects the 
Montgomery dicta of ‘patients as consumers’; see also Montgomery (2006).
6 Though this model has been criticised as not reflecting the reality that medicine is delivered by a multi-
disciplinary team of health professionals—see, for example, Montgomery (1989) at p332.
7 McGreevy and Bennett describe a companion animal as one used for human companionship, rather 
than to work or to produce a product. This type of animal patient has been chosen to approximate most 
closely with the paediatric patient.
8 See, for example, Francione (1995).
9 For example, in Charles and Davies 2008 sociological study of families, a significant proportion of 
interviewees included pets in their kinship network. Ashall and Hobson-West (2017) have proposed that 
this kinship be acknowledged in the veterinary context, while Fox (2004) has argued for legal recognition 
of cross-species kinship.
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provisions in the professional guidance for veterinary surgeons suggest that the 
owner’s autonomy is tempered by the veterinary surgeon’s professional obligation 
to provide treatment in the best interests of the animal, and to make animal welfare 
paramount. For example, on admission to the profession in the UK, veterinary pro-
fessionals declare an undertaking to “…ABOVE ALL… ensure the health and wel-
fare of animals committed to my care” (RCVS 2017b), a statement reinforced by the 
profession’s Code of Conduct, which states that veterinary surgeons must make ani-
mal health and welfare their “first consideration when attending to animals.” (RCVS 
2017a).10
Given these key differences between animal and human medical practice, we 
argue that caution is needed in importing the language of informed consent and 
autonomy into the veterinary context and that a new protocol is necessary to inform 
professional veterinary ethics and practice. Our approach would recognise client 
autonomy where appropriate, affording it priority in situations where the animal’s 
welfare will not be compromised by the particular choice of treatment options. How-
ever, where welfare concerns exist, we propose a beneficence-based approach to 
decision-making. This “middle way” recognises the tensions that result from negoti-
ating the veterinarian/owner/animal relationship, which calls into question standard 
models of patients and health professionals, given both the contested legal status of 
animals and the way in which veterinary practices effectively operate as businesses 
involved in delivering private healthcare to human clients who pay for their services. 
Yet at the core of these interventions both veterinarian and owner have responsibil-
ity for the health and welfare of animal patients who can neither indicate their pre-
ferred choices, nor refuse proposed treatment. Recognising these blurred boundaries 
and responsibilities, we suggest that an approach which seeks to integrate animal 
welfare with owner autonomy not only affords better protection to animal patients, 
but may go some way to assuaging the significant ethical tensions and associated 
stress reported by the veterinary profession (Batchelor and McKeegan 2012).
The Case for Autonomy
The Rise of Autonomy in Human Healthcare
The concept of autonomy has become prominent over time, to the point where it is now 
recognised as the dominant principle or value at the heart of health law. The notion of 
requiring informed consent by the patient was first applied in the context of medical 
research, following the atrocities committed by Nazi doctors during the Second World 
War. The resulting Nuremberg Code described this form of consent as follows:
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential.
…the person involved should have legal capacity to give consent; should be so 
situated as to be able to exercise free power of choice, without the intervention 
of any element of force, fraud, deceit, duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior 
10 RCVS (2017), at Sect. 2.1.
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form of constraint or coercion; and should have sufficient knowledge and com-
prehension of the elements of the subject matter involved, as to enable him to 
make an understanding and enlightened decision. (US Government 1949)11
Since then, growing awareness of and implementation of human rights (especially 
post the Human Rights Act 1998), increasing patient access to medical knowledge, 
and an apparent decline of trust in the medical profession (O’Neill 2002; Case 2017) 
have led to autonomy assuming ever greater importance in doctor-patient decision-
making (Maclean 2009). Before considering the legal implications of this, we clar-
ify how autonomy is understood in the health context.
Mill’s utilitarian version of autonomy has tended to dominate doctor-patient deci-
sion-making. Such autonomy, based on self-interest and self-knowledge, can only be 
overruled to prevent harm to others (Beauchamp and Childress 2013). This version 
of autonomy can lead to decisions that may seem harmful to outsiders. However, 
prioritising the autonomy of a competent individual means that even harmful deci-
sions are considered valid. Professional ethical guidelines for doctors promote this 
Millian version of patient autonomy. For example, in the General Medical Council 
(GMC)’s 1998 guidance on consent, doctors were advised that:
…you must respect patients’ autonomy - their right to decide whether or not to 
undergo any medical intervention even where a refusal may result in harm to 
themselves or in their own death. (GMC 1998)
Explicit reference to patient autonomy disappeared from the revised GMC guidance, 
issued in 2008, but a similar version of autonomy is implied:
You must respect a patient’s decision to refuse an investigation or treatment, 
even if you think their decision is wrong or irrational… You must not, how-
ever, put pressure on a patient to accept your advice. (GMC 2008)
Therefore, a libertarian autonomy, based on self-interest, is now the dominant ver-
sion of autonomy enshrined in professional ethical guidance for human patients. The 
next section considers how this relates to UK health law, which has also witnessed a 
trend towards the recognition of autonomy, albeit more gradual given the historical 
tendency of judges to defer to medical expertise in decision-making.
The Role of Consent in Protecting Patient Autonomy in Human Healthcare
The doctrine of consent plays a key role throughout UK law, as well as in health 
care provision. If medical treatment is provided in the absence of a valid consent 
the health professional commits a criminal offence or may be sued in negligence. 
This has led to UK courts grappling with the question of what information must 
be disclosed to the patient in order to ensure that his or her consent is legally valid. 
The 2015 Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board may 
be regarded as the culmination of a gradual trend towards recognising autonomy 
11 See also Annas and Grodin (1995).
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in medical negligence cases. Space precludes a detailed critical examination of the 
emergence of this complex and contested shift. Rather, here, we outline some of the 
key moments in the legal history.
Prior to Montgomery, a series of cases grappling with the legal obligation to dis-
close risks were haunted by the spectre of the 1957 decision in Bolam v Friern Hos-
pital Management Committee.12 In a direction to the jury, later expressly approved 
by the House of Lords,13 McNair J ruled that a doctor was:
… not guilty of negligence if he has acted in accordance with a practice 
accepted as proper by a responsible body of medical men skilled in that par-
ticular art.14
This ruling is, of course, a product of an era of judicial deference to medical exper-
tise, and as John Harrington has suggested, it “can be framed not as wild aberra-
tion but as a pragmatic strategy for managing legal contingency”(Harrington 2017: 
18). Moreover, as Harrington demonstrates, under this test for negligence, “the law 
opens itself to change in clinical standards as the opinion of ‘responsible practition-
ers’ shifts over time.” (Harrington 2017:72). Nevertheless, it took until 1985 for the 
application of the Bolam test to the issue of information disclosure15 (as opposed 
to diagnosis and treatment), to be seriously challenged. Sidaway centred on a sur-
geon’s alleged failure to warn a patient of a less than 1% chance of spinal damage. 
While the case was unanimously decided in favour of the surgeon, it contained a 
noteworthy dissenting judgment from Lord Scarman on the appropriate standard to 
be applied for disclosure of risk, holding that Bolam did not apply to the test for risk 
disclosure (as opposed to diagnosis and treatment). Since there was no question of 
lack of skill or care in the treatment given by the surgeon involved, Lord Scarman 
ruled that the question was whether the surgeon:
gave consideration, which the law requires him to give, to the right of the 
patient to make up her own mind, in the light of the relevant information, 
whether or not she will accept the treatment which he proposes.16
He thereby proposed a “prudent patient” test, as opposed to the Bolam doctor-ori-
ented test, thus marking a decisive shift in the jurisprudence on consent and a first 
step towards incorporation of the doctrine of informed consent into UK law. On the 
issue of materiality of risk, he suggested the test should be:
…what would a reasonably prudent patient think significant if in the situation 
of this patient?17
16 Per Lord Scarman in Sidaway, at 876 G-H.
17 Per Lord Scarman in Sidaway at 888H; see also Lee (1987).
12 [1957] 2 All ER.
13 In Whitehouse v. Jordan and Another [1981] 1 WLR 46 as regards diagnosis and treatment and Sida-
way v Board of Governors of the Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] 1 AC 1 as regards information disclo-
sure.
14 Bolam at 587.
15 See note 13 above.
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Lord Scarman’s reasoning was to prove influential in a series of decisions through-
out the 1990s, where a more ‘pro-patient’ view gradually prevailed.18 In 1998 this 
refashioning of Bolam was given particular impetus by the House of Lords’ judg-
ment in Bolitho v. City and Hackney Health Authority,19 which stipulated that in 
order to be deemed ‘responsible’ a body of medical opinion must be shown to have 
a logical basis and could not simply be accepted by the court. This ruling signalled 
the beginning of the end for the dominant position that courts had accorded experts 
since Bolam (Brazier and Miola 2000). It was followed a year later by Pearce v 
United Bristol Health Care NHS Trust20 in which the Court of Appeal held that it 
would usually be necessary to disclose a significant risk which would have affected 
the judgment of a reasonable patient. Lord Woolf MR noted that:
If there is a significant risk which would affect the judgment of a reason-
able patient, then in the normal course it is the responsibility of the doctor to 
inform the patient of that significant risk, if the information is needed so that 
the patient can determine for him or herself as to what course he or she would 
adopt.21
As Michael Jones has suggested, Lord Woolf’s dicta appeared to combine a ‘prudent 
patient’ with a ‘reasonable doctor’ standard (Jones 1999:118), and certainly, as Alas-
dair McLean notes, there is a significant difference between the Pearce test (i.e. that 
those risks which a reasonable doctor believes the reasonable patient ought to find 
significant must be disclosed) and a test that would require disclosure of the infor-
mation that a reasonable patient would want to be told (Maclean 2004). Pearce was, 
however, reaffirmed by the House of Lords in Chester v Afshar22 which concluded 
that ‘medical paternalism no longer rules.’23 Although the case ultimately turned on 
causation, the decision in Chester effectively awarded damages to the patient for loss 
of autonomy, stressing that the court, and not the medical profession was ‘the final 
arbiter of what constitutes informed consent’.24 These developments culminated in 
the 2015 Montgomery ruling, when the UK Supreme Court reversed the original 
ruling of the Inner House of the Court of Session that the plaintiff was not entitled to 
damages as a result of injuries caused to her child during labour. The Supreme Court 
upheld the plaintiff’s claim that she should have been warned of the risk of shoulder 
dystocia and offered a Caesarean delivery. In their speeches, Lords Kerr and Reed 
considered the main preceding cases, particularly Sidaway and its interpretation of 
Bolam, together with the 2008 advice from the General Medical Council, and stated 
that patients are now legally regarded as:
18 See, for example, Smith v Tunbridge Wells [1994] 5 Med LR 334; Smith v. Salford Health Authority 
[1994] Med LR 321 and Lybert v. Warrington Health Authority [1996] 7 Med LR 71.
19 [1998] AC 232.
20 [1999] P.I.Q.R. 53.
21 Per Lord Woolf in Pearce at 21.
22 Chester v Afshar [2005] 1 A.C. 134.
23 Per Lord Steyn in Chester, at 16.
24 Ibid, at 14.
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persons holding rights, rather than as the passive recipients of the care of the 
medical profession… [and are] … also widely treated as consumers exercising 
choices.25
The reference to patients as “consumers” suggests a Millian approach to autonomy, 
according to which patients should be provided with all available options and be free 
to choose whichever treatment they wish, regardless of whether their choice is rea-
sonable. As Harrington observes, the Supreme Court thus draws an explicit distinc-
tion “between a zone in which the profession is largely free to determine technical 
matters and one in which non-technical choices are made by patients and supervised 
by the courts.”(Harrington 2017:175). Baroness Hale grounded her understanding 
of autonomy in bodily integrity, noting that:
the interest which the law of negligence protects is a person’s interest in their 
own physical and psychiatric integrity, an important feature of which is their 
autonomy.26
Montgomery, therefore, upholds the primacy of patient autonomy and can be seen 
as marking the handing over of responsibility for “determining the nature and extent 
of patients’ rights” from the medical profession to the Courts (Farrell and Brazier 
2016:87). However, Farrell and Brazier also acknowledge that for all its symbolic 
importance, in practice Montgomery may have merely aligned the law with cur-
rent GMC guidance on consent and professional practice.27 Others have questioned 
how radical Montgomery is, suggesting, for example, that it would have been more 
ground-breaking to “entirely reframe consent in relation to healthcare through the 
prism of autonomy-based human rights….” (McHale 2017:450). In similar vein, 
Montgomery and Montgomery have noted the irony that the rhetorical support for 
autonomy in the judgments sits uneasily with how it disregarded the actual choices 
of “an intelligent, educated, articulate, independent and well-supported woman” 
(Montgomery and Montgomery 2016:89). Nevertheless, the case can be regarded 
as landmark, partly due to its impact on practice, including the production of revised 
consent guidelines from the Royal College of Surgeons of England (2016),28 and the 
publication of several articles advising various healthcare professions on consent.29
25 Per Lords Kerr and Reed in Montgomery at 75[G].
26 Per Baroness Hale in Montgomery at 108[C]. Counter arguments suggest that autonomy does not 
equate to bodily integrity, as “the right to bodily integrity is not lost when autonomy is lost” for example, 
through a reduction in mental capacity - Herring and Wall (2017), at 583. How this might apply to ani-
mals raises interesting questions, since claims for protection of an animal’s physical integrity may be dif-
ficult to sustain, given the interference with bodily integrity permitted by animal welfare legislation, e.g., 
the Animal Welfare Act 2006 controversially permits the docking of dogs’ tails up to 5 days’ old, pro-
vided that they are identified as working dogs (s6(3)) - see Fox (2010). When discussing non-therapeutic 
sterilisation, even proponents of animal rights have suggested that the right to bodily integrity is less 
important than the right not to be property, for example, see Fusfeld (2007).
27 See also Heywood (2015); Heywood and Miola (2017); Herring et al. (2017).
28 As an example of its broader implications, in O’Hare v Coutts & Co [2016] EWHC 2224 the High 
Court applied Montgomery to a case involving financial advice.
29 See, for example, Bright et al (2017). In this article the authors refer to Montgomery as the law on 
clinical negligence catching up with developments within the professions, as General Dental Council 
advice pre-Montgomery already used a reasonable patient standard.
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Critiques of Autonomy in Human Healthcare
Having outlined the rise to prominence of autonomy in the arena of medical-deci-
sion making, it is important to stress that lively and ongoing critiques exist, both 
in practice and in the scholarship. First, commentators have argued that autonomy 
must be tempered with responsible patient choice, which considers the position of 
relevant others (Stirrat and Gill 2005). Such views align with those who criticise 
unfettered autonomy, many of whom prefer a Kantian approach, which is “not about 
free choice, but about the drive to appropriate or moral action.”(Donnelly 2009:19). 
According to these authors, Kantian autonomy is essentially relational and cannot 
fail to consider the impact of a decision on others, particularly those in close rela-
tionships (Maclean 2009). Similarly, Brazier (2006) claims that the trend in favour 
of patients’ rights after decades of paternalism has resulted in over-correction of the 
imbalance. Pleading for the return of the three “neglected” principles of biomedical 
ethics: non-maleficence, beneficence and justice—she maintains that, alongside the 
right to autonomy, patients have reciprocal duties to ensure that their decisions do 
not breach other principles in terms of the provision of healthcare for others. Thus, 
responsibility for choice includes considering the consequences of that choice.
Second, autonomy may not suit every human patient in practice. In some circum-
stances, patients with capacity may wish others to be involved in decision-making, 
or they may prefer the healthcare professional to make the decision for them, thus 
abdicating their right to autonomy. For example, with reference to oncological deci-
sion-making, Cherny considers that “relational autonomy”, which takes into account 
the patient’s preferences for involvement of her relatives in decision-making, or 
“voluntary diminished autonomy”, where the patient requests that the medical pro-
fessional makes the decision on her behalf, may be appropriate (Cherny 2012:38).30
Third, it is interesting that in Montgomery itself Baroness Hale sounds a caution-
ary note, observing that a patient cannot force her doctors to offer treatment, specifi-
cally treatments that are “futile or inappropriate.”31 Similarly, Heywood and Miola 
(2017) have highlighted the difficulties even post-Montgomery that a patient may 
face in demonstrating that they have withdrawn their consent. Coggon and Miola 
(2011) have also contended that courts have tended to confuse autonomy and liber-
tarianism, which can result in untrammelled liberty undermining autonomy in prac-
tice, for instance, where the patient does not actually understand the information.
Still more fundamentally, legal theorist Martha Fineman (2004) has contended 
that autonomy is a flawed concept and that other principles, such as dependency or 
vulnerability, offer a more appropriate basis for legal decision-making. In summary, 
compelling arguments exist against the wholesale adoption of autonomy as the sole 
basis of informed consent in the medical treatment of competent adults. Such argu-
ments apply with greater force in the case of human patients who cannot make deci-
sions for themselves, i.e., adult patients who lack capacity or the not-yet-competent 
30 Cherny argues that these types of situation should be respected as “nuanced” forms of autonomy.
31 Per Baroness Hale in Montgomery, at 115B.
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child patient, where proxy decision-makers may be necessary.32 We now address 
whether this claim also holds true for veterinary healthcare, especially given the 
dependency of companion animals upon their owners.33
The Difficulty of Prioritising Autonomy in a Tripartite Relationship
Perhaps significantly, the UK case law on patient autonomy and the doctrine of 
informed consent has developed within the context of a straightforward dyadic rela-
tionship between health professional and competent adult patient, who are increas-
ingly represented as equal partners in the consent process. As noted above, this may 
be contrasted with the tripartite relationship existing between the veterinary profes-
sional, the owner and the animal patient. As Ashall and Hobson-West (2017:913) 
observe:
With regards to decision-making in companion animal medicine, a triadic 
relationship exists between the animal, owner and vet. This makes veterinary 
medicine ethically complex, especially when the welfare needs of the animal 
and the wishes of the owner come into conflict. In fact, the tension that veteri-
narians experience in trying to serve the interests of both animal patients and 
paying clients has been called the fundamental question in veterinary ethics.
This triadic relationship does not necessarily impact on the criteria which must be 
met for valid consent to be given. As Ashall et al. (2018) have argued, consent in 
both human and veterinary medicine demand that treatment is freely chosen on the 
basis of appropriate information disclosure and adequate understanding. However, 
the objective of informed consent is different in each professional setting, since, as 
Ashall et al. (2018: 255) point out:
Whilst medical consent protects a patient’s rights to make autonomous deci-
sions concerning their own body, veterinary informed consent aims to protect 
an owner’s right to make autonomous decisions concerning their legal prop-
erty.
Indeed, the owner can lay claim to consideration as a “consumer exercising choices,” 
as described by the Supreme Court in Montgomery.34 Yet, as we argued above, any 
obligation to respect the owner’s wishes must be constrained by the vet’s paramount 
professional duty to provide treatment in the best interests of the animal (RCVS 
32 In the case of adult patients, a statutory presumption of capacity exists so that the individual must be 
presumed to be competent to decide unless proven otherwise according to the statutory test of capac-
ity. Even then, attempts must be made to elicit the patient’s past and present wishes, thus respecting her 
autonomy. See Mental Capacity Act 2005 and Taylor (n6). It is only then that decisions are made to pro-
tect her interests.
33 Satz (2009) has suggested that this dependency renders animals the most vulnerable of all legal sub-
jects - see also Deckha (2015).
34 Montgomery at 75H.
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2017a).35 These professional obligations echo the legal obligations applicable to 
children, contained in the common law and the Children Act 1989, which require 
that child welfare is the paramount consideration.
Of course, analogies between the medical treatment of animals and children are 
not exact. Children, unlike animals, are deemed to be persons with legal rights and 
entitlements (Eekelaar 1986; Freeman 1992; Bridgeman and Monk 2000; Stalford 
et  al. 2017), notwithstanding arguments that in many respects they are treated as 
legal objects.36 In addition, no legal mechanism analogous to the wardship jurisdic-
tion, nor any body equivalent to the Official Solicitor’s office (Allen 2017) to protect 
the interests of animal patients exists. Furthermore, the diversity of animal patients, 
as regards species,37 use, and perceived value to their owners, may influence the 
ability or willingness of the animal owner to pay for veterinary treatment. And, 
finally, of course, virtually all veterinary treatment will be delivered as part of a 
commercial contract, paid for by the owner or their insurance company. This means 
that legal actions will typically be contractual rather than tortious in nature. How-
ever, as Rachel Mulheron (2017) points out, this is unlikely to make a difference in 
practice, since the scope of the duty owed to the patient under a contractual claim is 
unlikely to differ from that in the tort of negligence. Rather, as is the case with doc-
tors carrying out procedures under a contract, the contract between the veterinary 
professional and the owner will have implied into it a duty not to act negligently 
by exercising reasonable care and skill in diagnosing and treating the condition as 
well as in advising the owners and disclosing relevant information. However, only 
in exceptional circumstances will the professional have been taken to guarantee the 
outcome of the procedure.38
Significantly, in the animal context there has not been the discernible shift away 
from paternalism that we identified above in human medical decision-making. For 
example, in cases of alleged veterinary negligence or misconduct, the RCVS con-
tinues to follow a “reasonable practitioner” standard when advising professionals.39 
38 See, for example, Thake v Maurice [1986] QB 644; see also ARB v IVF Hammersmith Ltd [2017] 
EWHC 2438.
35 This duty is emphasised in the Supporting Guidance to the RCVS Code of Professional Conduct, Vet-
erinary Care, which advises that veterinary professionals should “make decisions on treatment regimes 
based first and foremost on animal health and welfare considerations….” at 2.2.c.
36 As Archard and Macleod (2002:1) have suggested, the child is conceived as “if not precisely a thing 
to be owned… in some sense, an extension of the parent”; see also O’Donovan (1993). Indeed there is 
some debate as to whether children are owed a legal duty of care by their parents – see dicta by Lady 
Hale in Woodland v. Swimming Teachers Association and others [2014] AC 537, at 589.
37 Although human patients differ in terms of, for example, age, capacity and ethnicity, there is a more 
obvious “speciesism” in the world of animal treatment. We give different levels of legal protection to dif-
ferent species, and to different members of the same species. Rats can be killed in apparently inhumane 
ways for pest control, but their deaths are strictly regulated if they are used for research, and there are 
higher levels of justification required for using certain species of animal, such as primates, dogs and cats, 
in research. See Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act 1986.
39 See RCVS notes on negligence https ://www.rcvs.org.uk/docum ent-libra ry/a-note-on-negli gence / 
accessed 13 January 2018.
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Indeed, the lack of reported cases of veterinary negligence40 suggests that there is 
little prospect that a test for disclosure premised on the “reasonable client” standard 
will be developed via the courts, as has happened with human patients.41
In summary, whilst human medicine has travelled some distance from the “rea-
sonable physician” standard in terms of informed consent, the UK veterinary pro-
fession currently seems content to endorse a “reasonable veterinarian” standard. In 
part this may be due to the obstacles we have identified to applying the concept of 
autonomy to animals given its grounding in the concept of human rights.42 By con-
trast, animal patients, even those in companion roles, lack legal status and therefore 
cannot have rights protected by an autonomy-based consent. In short, we consider 
that the concept of autonomy is neither easily applied to the animal nor to the owner 
in the veterinary context, and so in the next section turn to consider the merits of an 
alternative approach.
The Case for Beneficence
Beneficence‑Based Consent and the Legal Status of Animals
In the UK, animals’ lack of legal status has been reinforced through statute and case 
law:
Domestic animals, like other personal and movable chattels, are the subject of 
absolute property. The owner can maintain a claim for their detention or con-
version, or for trespass to goods in respect of them, and retains his property in 
them if they stray or are lost.43
Nevertheless, owners face restrictions on how they can treat their ‘animal property’, 
suggesting that animals comprise a special type of property (Deckha 2012). Thus, 
the Animal Welfare Act 2006 obliges owners to provide for the welfare needs of 
their animals, including the treatment of injury and disease. Under section 9.2(e) the 
40 A search of legal databases for cases of alleged veterinary negligence in the United Kingdom revealed 
eight reported cases, of which only two mentioned risk disclosure, and then only as a side issue. See De 
Maynard v Streatham Hill Veterinary Surgery [2001] EWCA Civ 1728 and Calver v Westwood Veteri-
nary Group [2001] P.I.Q.R. P11.
41 A sudden surge in veterinary negligence cases is improbable for several reasons. First, there are sig-
nificantly lower awards available (confined to the economic value of the animal only) for breach of the 
duty of care to an animal patient, and this is coupled with the costs involved in bringing such a case to 
court. Recently, the successful introduction of a mediation and arbitration service by the RCVS in 2016 
has led to an extension of the trial of the Veterinary Client Mediation Service, leading to even more cases 
being settled out of court (see https ://www.vetme diati on.co.uk). Finally, as Fox (2012) notes, it may take 
a scandal of similar proportions to those that prompted reforms in medical regulation, or a challenge 
based on human rights legislation, to force change on the profession in terms of how it regulates itself 
and how it decides cases of alleged misconduct.
42 Heywood (2015:463) illustrates this through the change in judicial language, from “self-determina-
tion” to “autonomy”.
43 Halsbury’s Laws of England, Vol 2, Sect. 2.1.6. Absolute Property in Domestic Animals (2017).
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owner is responsible for ensuring that an animal is “protected from pain, suffering, 
injury and disease.”44 This means that failure to seek appropriate veterinary treat-
ment for an animal could result in the owner being prosecuted under anti-cruelty 
legislation. However, in contrast to the case of children, there is, as we have seen, no 
legal mechanism to require owners to comply with veterinary advice through a civil 
court order.45 Moreover, although the RCVS requires veterinary professionals to pri-
oritise welfare, this obligation continues to be balanced against the client’s financial 
and other considerations. The College advises its members to make decisions about 
treatment “based first and foremost on animal health and welfare considerations, 
but also the needs and circumstances of the client” (RCVS 2017)46 and to “consider 
the welfare implications of any surgical or other procedure and advise or act appro-
priately.”47 Consequently, notwithstanding certain commonalities in their position as 
patients, key differences exist between how animal/owner and child/parent relation-
ships are regarded in law. And, although the concept of beneficence or “doing good 
for the patient”(Donnelly 2009:11) is central to decision-making for both types of 
patient, as we discuss below, much will depend on how this is translated into the 
legal requirement that best interests be promoted.
Beauchamp and Childress (2013:203) outline two types of beneficence.48 “Posi-
tive beneficence,” also termed “obligatory beneficence,” requires agents to provide 
benefits to others, and may be general (aimed at all others) or specific (aimed at 
those with whom we have special relationships, such as family, friends, patients). 
Positive beneficence could be applied to the veterinary professional (for example, an 
obligation to treat all animal patients, using the best available treatment, regardless 
of the owner’s circumstances) or to the animal owner (for example, an obligation to 
fund the best available treatment, even if unable to afford it) but it is difficult to see 
how this could work in practice, unless limited to “reasonably necessary treatment” 
(Yeates and Main 2010:266).49
“Utility beneficence,” on the other hand, obliges agents to balance benefits and 
harms to produce the best results for others. In the case of the animal patient, this 
would mean balancing the benefits of each treatment option (such as improved 
44 Animal Welfare Act 2006, S9.2(e).
45 As is the case with the Children Act 1989. The Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Ani-
mals (RSPCA) will, however, often issue improvement notices to owners, rather than prosecuting them, 
which has some parallels with Specific Orders issued for parents although the RSPCA notices are non-
statutory (84,000 improvement notices were issued in 2016, vs. 1400 prosecutions) See https ://view.paget 
iger.com/RSPCA Prose cutio nsAnn ualre port2 016 Accessed 13 January 2018.
46 Supporting Guidance – Veterinary Care at 2.2c.
47 Ibid at 2.2f.
48 We prefer to use the term “beneficence” rather than “paternalism” in situations where the decision-
maker is not the patient, thus avoiding the negative connotations of the latter term.
49 Yeates and Main suggest that responsible ownership might include the obligation to fund reasonably 
necessary treatment. They do not, however, go on to define “reasonably necessary”, but imply that there 
are limits to the obligation to fund treatment. Veterinary professionals are required, under the RCVS 
Code of Professional Conduct, to provide immediate first aid and pain relief to any animal, regardless of 
the owner’s ability to pay (See Supporting Guidance ‘Providing First Aid and Pain Relief’, Sects. 3.7–
3.9).
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quality of life, improved health and the maintenance of the human-animal relation-
ship) with the costs to the client (including financial) and the risks to the patient, 
to produce the best result in terms of welfare. Utility beneficence recognises that, 
as veterinary practices are private health enterprises, treatment decisions are often 
influenced by factors other than the evidence base for available treatments. We now 
consider how this balance could be achieved in practice, starting with an investiga-
tion into the legal form of utility beneficence - the “best interests” standard.
The Challenge of Calculating Best Interests
For human patients it is clear that “best interests” no longer equates to “best medi-
cal interests”(Coggon 2016). Since the decision in Airedale NHS Trust v Bland,50 
the “best interests” standard for incompetent humans has evolved, and primar-
ily as a result of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, it is now necessary to incorporate 
the patient’s previously stated wishes and values in any decisions where possible 
(Coggon 2016:409). Best interests can also encompass a patient’s “metaphysical 
interests”(Coggon 2008:225).
Given current levels of knowledge about animal cognition, it is difficult to ascer-
tain the veterinary patient’s wishes. Superficially, animals can react to any proposed 
treatment by showing aggression, which could be regarded as a form of ‘dissent’. 
However, it is only in rare cases that the animal’s preferences are taken into con-
sideration. A more common reaction to such ‘dissent’ is behavioural modification, 
through training, desensitisation, and the use of food rewards, to persuade such 
a reluctant animal patient to acquiesce to the treatment decided by the humans 
involved (Moffat 2008). If the situation is more urgent, then many veterinary profes-
sionals advise sedating the patient to enable treatment to be given.51 Thus, it is com-
mon to prioritise the animal patient’s health interests above other welfare interests.52 
The situation is somewhat different with child patients, though it is worth noting that 
there are similar difficulties to the animal patient situation in talking meaningfully 
about the wishes of a very young child (Alderson 2008). The best interests test origi-
nated as a legal requirement in child custody cases at common law, and was later 
applied in paediatric healthcare (Birchley 2014).53 In an ideal situation, parents and 
healthcare professionals will agree on the best interests of the child. If they fail to 
agree, then a court declaration should be sought. However, a major problem with an 
objective “best interests” standard has been the difficulty of defining ‘best interests’. 
According to Baines (2010),54 this may be an ontological problem (there may be 
no such thing as objective best interests), or it may be an epistemological problem 
50 [1993] AC 789.
51 See, for example, van Haaften et al. (2017).
52 Indeed, promoting the animal’s health-related welfare is one reason for prioritising human decisions 
over animal decisions, according to Yeates (2018: 174).
53 Interestingly, in some jurisdictions, there have been moves to incorporate a “best interests of the ani-
mal” test in pet custody cases. See Rook (2014) and Deckha (2012).
54 For more on the legal aspects of best interests for children, see Bridgeman (2012).
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(best interests may exist, but there is no way of discovering what they are). Histori-
cally, doctors did tend to consider best interests from a medical perspective (Ken-
nedy 1991), although numerous cases post the Human Rights Act have confirmed 
that they are now legally required to consider wider interests, and to involve other 
members of the healthcare team.55 For instance, dicta in cases involving sterilisa-
tion of incompetent patients, later cited with approval in cases of child patients, have 
pointed to the breadth of best interest calculations:
When considering the best interests of a patient, it is… the duty of the court to 
assess the advantages and disadvantages of the various treatment and manage-
ment options, the viability of each such option and the likely effect each would 
have on the patient’s best interests and, I would add, his enjoyment of life… 
any likely benefit of treatment has to be balanced and considered in the light of 
any additional suffering the treatment option would entail.56
Similarly, Section  1(3) of the Children Act offers a list of factors which courts 
should take into account in determining the best interests of the child, including the 
risk of any harm, and the importance of assessing the emotional as well as physical 
needs of the child.57 Many high profile paediatric cases involve medical decisions 
for terminally ill infants, where the interests of the parents and the interests of the 
child may clash.58 Drawing on the dicta cited above in Re A, Wall LJ refers to the 
basis for ‘best interests’ decision-making for children in Wyatt:
The judge must decide what is in the child’s best interests. In making that deci-
sion, the welfare of the child is paramount. The term “best interests” encom-
passes medical, emotional, and all other welfare issues (Re A). The court must 
conduct a balancing exercise in which all the relevant factors are weighed (Re 
J) and a helpful way of undertaking this exercise is to draw up a balance sheet 
(Re A).59
A similar approach to decision-making for animals could be adopted, though this 
too is fraught with difficulty, given the animal’s status as property, and the perhaps 
greater difficulties in ascertaining when animals enjoy life.60 As was historically the 
case with children, no consensus exists on what should be included in a ‘best inter-
ests’ calculation for animals. The RCVS Code of Conduct and Supporting Guid-
ance (2017) refers to the “best interests” of the animal on four occasions, without 
expanding on the meaning of the term. An alternative approach would be to adopt 
55 Although Baines (2010) maintains that doctors are actually better placed to decide on a child’s objec-
tive best interests than judges, for example.
56 Per Dame Butler Sloss, Re A (medical treatment: male sterilisation) [2000] 1 FLR 549.
57 Children Act 1989s.1(3).
58 See, for example, Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt [2005] EWCA Civ 1181, where the disagreement 
between parents and professionals was profound, and the court ruled that the child should be entitled to a 
“peaceful death”.
59 Portsmouth NHS Trust v Wyatt at 87.
60 Although, as more work is published on animal emotions, measurement of “enjoyment of life” may be 
more achievable. See, for example, Mellor (2011).
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the position that a procedure may be performed provided it is ‘not against’ the ani-
mal’s interests (rather than positively in their best interests) as was advocated in 
some early cases involving children.61 However, as Neil Allen has noted, such an 
approach to treating children is difficult to reconcile either with basic principle or 
with more recent cases (Allen 2017). This view has recently been confirmed by the 
ruling in Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust v Evans. The Supreme Court 
rejected an argument made by the parents of a terminally ill child that, in evaluating 
their request to take their child abroad for treatment, the appropriate test should be 
that such an intervention would not cause ‘significant harm’, even if it could not be 
regarded as positively in the child’s ‘best interests’.62 The Supreme Court was clear 
that the gold standard for medical decision-making was that the proposed course of 
treatment was in the child’s interests. This more positive conception of best interests 
also seems to be accepted by the profession in the case of decision-making about 
animals. For instance, the British Veterinary Association (2018), in guidance docu-
ments on treatment and euthanasia decision-making, promotes a “quality of life” 
evaluation in conjunction with balancing harms and benefits to both owner and ani-
mal, again without further explanation. A useful list of criteria on which to base 
a ‘best interests’ calculation for companion animals has recently been proposed by 
Schnobel (2017:253) who suggests that it should include quality of life, the ability 
to function naturally, the ability to participate in a mutually beneficial companion 
relationship with the owner, and it should incorporate the veterinary professional’s 
knowledge of the individual animal and its lifestyle. Arguably, however, the latter 
criterion depends heavily on the owner’s perceptions and reporting of that lifestyle, 
in much the same way that ‘best interests’ decision-making for children continues 
to accord excessive power to parents (Fox and Thomson 2017). We propose that 
the list should also include an assessment of the risks involved with any proposed 
treatment, with the veterinary professional best placed to disclose evidence-based 
information about the level of these risks, and that in line with Montgomery this 
information should be based on what a reasonable client/owner would want to know.
Amongst numerous practical criticisms levelled at the ‘best interests’ test as 
applied to children, commentators have charged that the standard lacks content, is 
couched in unclear terminology which offers no meaningful guide to profession-
als, and that it operates to advance parental and professional interests at the expense 
of children (Fox and Thomson 2017). Thus, notwithstanding the attempts out-
lined above to flesh out how the test is to be applied in law in order to encompass 
a broader range of factors, it remains the case, as Stalford (2017:38) argues, that 
“best interests assessments are unnervingly instinctive and highly contingent on the 
subjective assessment and value framework of the decision-maker”. Indeed, as Hey-
wood’s analysis of the more recent case law demonstrates, it remains extremely rare 
in practice for parental views to be challenged or overturned in the courts (Heywood 
2012). Ultimately, then, parents retain considerable power over decision-making for 
61 SvS [1972] AC 24 which concerned administration of a blood test.
62 [2018] EWHC 308 (Fam); Supreme Court, Reasons given online, https ://www.supre mecou rt.uk/cases /
docs/alfie -evans -reaso ns-20031 8.pdf Accessed 8 April 2018.
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their children, up to the point where their decisions are deemed to very adversely 
affect their children’s best interests.63 We now reflect on whether animal owners 
should be endowed with the same authority, and whether it is possible to meaning-
fully disentangle the interests of animals from their owners.
Identifying Who Should Protect the Best Interests of the Animal Patient
Perhaps the most striking distinction between decision-making for children and 
animal patients is the complexity of the relationships and the obligations on the 
veterinarian in mediating them. Indeed, some authors argue that the veterinary 
professional has a responsibility to maintain, as far as possible, the unique human-
companion animal relationship.64 Unfortunately, such a focus on the relationship 
may reinforce the status of the animal patient as property, and result in a failure 
to disentangle those interests from those of the owner. For instance, in his critique 
of the popular UK television programme “Supervet,” Mills argues that treatment is 
presented as being less important for the animal and more important as a way of 
fixing a dysfunctional human-animal relationship. “The animals remain primarily 
objects, constructed as medicalized bodies requiring fixing in order to assuage the 
emotional needs of the owner.” (Mills 2016: 248). This observation lends weight to 
demands for limits to the scope of owner consent (Ashall et al. 2018). Yet, by high-
lighting extreme scenarios, it may be argued that authors such as Mills are unduly 
concerned about clients requesting unethical treatment, given that such situations 
are likely governed by existing legal sanctions. For example, the potential for caus-
ing unnecessary suffering requires both parties to comply with the provisions of 
relevant animal welfare legislation, although reporting or proving breaches may be 
problematic given the veterinarian-client relationship.65
Is it therefore correct to assume that animal owners are the “best” decision-mak-
ers for animals in their charge, echoing assumpions regarding parental decision-
making? Building on Salter’s arguments in relation to children,66 one could argue 
that: first, the owner is best placed to report on the animal patient’s preferences and 
desires and second, it is the owner who will bear some of the burden resulting from 
any decision, whether this be financial, emotional or relational (Salter 2012). The 
point about finances is particularly important. As we have seen, veterinary treat-
ment remains an individual contract-based service between the animal owner (cli-
ent) and the veterinary surgeon (professional). The owner retains autonomy over 
63 See Alder Hey Children’s NHS Foundation Trust v Evans.
64 See, for example, Schnobel (2017), at 254. Also, the development of the term “bond-centred practice” 
in veterinary literature.
65 As noted earlier, positive duties are placed on companion animal owners and keepers by the Ani-
mal Welfare Act 2006, s9.1, making them responsible for ensuring that the animal’s needs are “met to 
the extent required by good practice,” Including protecting the animal from “pain, suffering, injury and 
disease.” However, in cases of non-compliance, vets may be reluctant to report owners to the relevant 
authorities for reasons of client confidentiality, and clients may be more likely to complain about vets to 
the RCVS rather than the RSPCA.
66 We have replaced “parent” with “owner”.
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financial decisions, able to choose between innovative and complicated surgery at 
one extreme, and euthanasia at the other, and the legitimacy of such decisions being 
entrusted to the owner is rarely questioned (Mills 2016). Financial constraints on 
treatment will clearly significantly impact on the owner’s decisions. Thus, any benef-
icence-based approach must recognise owners’ differing abilities (and willingness) 
to pay. In addition, when considering companion animals, it could be argued that the 
owner is in the best position to translate her partiality towards the individual animal 
(Yeates and Savalescu 2017), into reaching a decision on a “best interests” basis.67 
Given the need to reconcile these interests, we now turn to framing a proposal for 
veterinary decision-making which takes account of both the owner’s wishes and cir-
cumstances and the veterinary professional’s assessment of the animal’s welfare.
Conclusion: A Proposal for Equally Weighting Autonomy 
and Beneficence
To overcome the hypothetical situation where the autonomous and properly 
informed owner requests treatment for her animal that appears contrary to the ani-
mal’s best interests, we propose an alternative approach that provides a compromise 
between these competing interests. Our approach comprises “constrained [owner] 
autonomy” (Ross 1998:3)68 regarding financial commitment, provided that the avail-
able options have similar effects on the welfare of the patient, together with “utility 
beneficence” in cases where options with either significant welfare benefits, or nega-
tive welfare implications, are under consideration.69 At this point, it may be use-
ful to clarify how this “middle way” approach can be deployed in practice, and its 
implications for consent. In cases where none of the available treatment options have 
welfare implications for the animal patient (for example, there are several equally 
appropriate surgical procedures used to repair torn knee ligaments),70 there seems 
no ethical reason why the client’s decision should not prevail. Maximising the cli-
ent’s financial autonomy means discussing risks and benefits, including post-opera-
tive complications and aftercare required, and providing detailed cost estimates for 
each. It is at this point that the Montgomery ruling may have consequences for vet-
erinary practice, if it follows that the level of risk disclosure should approximate 
that required for human patients. Where welfare differentials exist, a “best interests” 
discussion can then be usefully employed to prioritise options that promote positive 
welfare for the patient. This discussion, while taking into account the client’s finan-
cial and other constraints, should aim to assist the client in making a decision that 
maintains positive welfare and, as far as possible, the human-animal relationship, 
67 This might parallel Bridgeman (2012)’s arguments as to why parents should generally be entrusted 
with making decisions for their children.
68 We have borrowed the phrase from Ross, Chapter 1, replacing “parent” with “owner”.
69 There is a separate argument regarding whether veterinary professionals are, or should be, obliged to 
offer all available options in every situation, but further exploration of this topic lies outside the scope of 
this paper.
70 See Aragon and Budsberg (2005).
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but is achievable for the individual client. In this regard we suggest that useful guid-
ance for veterinary professionals could be derived from the recent more nuanced 
tests applied to assessing children’s welfare which move beyond the avoidance of 
physical harm or a purely medical assessment of best interests. For example, in the 
case of a feline patient diagnosed with hyperthyroidism, there are several possible 
approaches to treatment. Those involved may take into account the patient’s known 
dislike for taking oral medication, therefore excluding one potential treatment 
option, which involves giving oral medication for life (Carney et al. 2016). Such an 
example suggests how the veterinary profession might derive lessons from the his-
tory of informed consent in human medicine, informing and advising the owner to 
make decisions that promote the best interests of the animal.
In this article we have critically revisited the legal doctrine of informed consent, 
tracing its rise over the past 30  years in UK law and its conceptual grounding in 
patient autonomy. Drawing on existing literature, we have outlined key criticisms 
of the concept, namely that autonomy does not underpin decision-making for every 
patient, that some patients do not wish to make decisions alone, and that autonomy 
neglects the interests of others affected by an individual patient’s decision. It is also 
unhelpful when used as a basis for decision-making by a third party, where other 
constraints such as finances and welfare apply. Our contribution has been to con-
sider the degree to which this doctrine is transferable to the veterinary context. We 
have argued that the challenges and tensions in the human field are heightened in the 
veterinary context, due to the tripartite nature of the animal-client-veterinary profes-
sional relationship, and the fact that, even post-Montgomery, choice and consum-
erism dominate the veterinary profession to an even greater extent than its human 
counterpart.71 While it is tempting to assume that veterinary practice can be directly 
compared with paediatrics, and such an assumption seems to underpin veterinary 
professional guidance, building on Ashall et  al’s (2018) observation that the pur-
poses of consent are different across the two domains, we have argued that a direct 
comparison is again problematic. Similarly, when evaluating the applicability of a 
‘best interests’ approach akin to that used in the paediatric context we have argued 
that it poses particular problems when it comes to defining the objective best inter-
ests of the animal, particularly given the contractual, commercial basis of veteri-
nary treatment which serves to further limit options. Moreover, given the difficulty 
of ascertaining the animal patient’s wishes, there is inevitably a continuing tendency 
to prioritise medical over other types of interest. In recognition of these factors, we 
are supportive of a middle ground which explicitly acknowledges the financial cir-
cumstances of the owner. This gives some scope for autonomous decision-making, 
expressed through freedom of choice between welfare-equivalent options. However, 
in our view such autonomy must ultimately be constrained where the veterinary 
professional has concerns about the impact of the client’s decision on animal wel-
fare. As a bottom line, no treatment decision which is against the animal’s interests 
can be regarded as ethical. Yet we would argue that the ethico-legal obigations on 
71 See Montgomery (2006) for a compelling critique of health law’s endorsement of consumerist rheto-
ric.
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the veterinary professional are more demanding, and, as in the case with children, 
the gold standard is that treatment decisions should be taken in the animal’s best 
interests. Here we return to the problem of the absence of specific guidance on the 
calculation of best interests for animal patients, suggesting that this is an area that 
would benefit from specific attention by the veterinary profession. In this regard 
we welcome recent policy moves by the profession to foreground its obligation to 
promote animal welfare,72 and are supportive of calls for more detailed, empirical 
work to highlight the practicalities of consent and other dilemmas in the veterinary 
field (Ashall et al. 2018; Hobson-West and Timmons 2015). For example, differing 
approaches to decision-making may be required for different animal species and the 
purposes for which they are kept. We accept that major changes to professional reg-
ulation, while desirable, are unlikely in the near future, and that for the reasons we 
have explained there is unlikely to be a body of case law comparable to that which 
has considered the obligations of health professionals treating humans. However, a 
key progression would be for the RCVS, as the profession’s regulator, to be more 
proactive in promoting a “best interests” basis for consent to treatment of animal 
patients. In short, we would recommend changing the Code of Professional Conduct 
to explicitly reference the balance that must be achieved between client autonomy 
and patient best interests when making treatment decisions for animals.73
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